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Abstract
Classification techniques are widely used in security settings in which data can
be deliberately manipulated by an adversary trying to evade detection and
achieve some benefit. However, traditional classification systems are not robust
to such data modifications. Most attempts to enhance classification algorithms
in adversarial environments have focused on game theoretical ideas under strong
underlying common knowledge assumptions, which are not actually realistic in
security domains. We provide an alternative framework to such problems based
on adversarial risk analysis which we illustrate with examples. Computational,
implementation and robustness issues are discussed.
Keywords: Classification, Bayesian Methods, Adversarial Machine Learning,
Influence Diagrams, Robustness.
1. Introduction
Classification is one of the most widely used instances of supervised learn-
ing, with applications in areas such as bioinformatics, Ghosh & Parai (2008);
spam detection, Goodman & Heckerman (2004); credit scoring, Hand & Henley
(1997); computer vision, Chen (2015); and genomics, Mallick et al. (2005). In
recent years, the field has experienced an enormous growth becoming a major
research area in statistics and machine learning, Efron & Hastie (2016). Most ef-
forts in classification have focused on obtaining more accurate algorithms which,
however, largely ignore a relevant issue in many application areas: the presence
of adversaries who can actively manipulate data to fool the classifier so as to
attain a benefit.
As a motivating example consider the case of fraud detection. As machine
learning algorithms are incorporated to such detection task, fraudsters begin
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to learn how to evade them. For instance, they could find out that making a
huge transaction increases the probability of being detected and start issuing
smaller transactions more frequently rather than a single big one. The presence
of adaptive adversaries has been pointed out in areas such as spam detection,
Zeager et al. (2017); fraud detection, Ko lcz & Teo (2009); and computer vision,
Goodfellow et al. (2015). In such contexts, algorithms should take into account
possible modifications on the behaviour of adversaries so as to be robust against
adversarial data manipulations.
Dalvi et al. (2004) provided a pioneering approach to enhance classification
algorithms when an adversary is present, calling it adversarial classification
(AC). They view AC as a game between a classifier C and an adversary A. The
classifier aims at finding an optimal classification strategy against A’s optimal
attacking strategy. Computing Nash equilibria, Ozdaglar & Menache (2011), in
such general games becomes overly complex. Therefore, they propose a simpli-
fied version in which C first assumes that data is untainted and computes her
optimal classifier; then, A deploys his optimal attack against it; subsequently, C
implements the optimal classifier against this attack, and so on. As the authors
pointed out, a very strong assumption is made: all parameters of both play-
ers are known to each other. Although standard in game theory, this common
knowledge assumption is actually unrealistic in security scenarios.
Stemming from this work, there has been an important literature in AC,
reviewed in Biggio et al. (2014) or Li & Vorobeychik (2014). Subsequent ap-
proaches have focused on analyzing attacks over classification algorithms and
assessing their robustness against such attacks. To that end, some assumptions
about the adversary are made. For instance, Lowd & Meek (2005) consider
that the adversary is able to send membership queries to the classifier, the
entire feature space being known to issue optimal attacks; then, they prove
the vulnerability of linear classifiers against adversaries. Similarly, Zhou et al.
(2012) consider that the adversary seeks to push his malicious instances into
innocuous ones, assuming that the adversary can estimate such instances.
A few methods have been proposed to robustify classification algorithms in
adversarial environments. Most of them have focused on application-specific do-
mains, as Ko lcz & Teo (2009) on spam detection. Vorobeychik & Li (2014) study
the impact of randomization schemes over different classifiers against adversar-
ial attacks proposing an optimal randomization scheme as best defense. Other
approaches have focused on improving the game theoretic model in Dalvi et al.
(2004) but, to our knowledge, none has been able to overcome the unrealistic
common knowledge assumptions, as may be seen in recent reviews by Biggio &
Roli (2018) and Zhou et al. (2018), which have also pointed out the importance
of this issue. As an example, Kantarcıog˘lu et al. (2011) use a Stackelberg game
in which both players know each other payoff functions. Only Großhans et al.
(2013) have attempted to relax common knowledge assumptions in adversar-
ial regression settings, reformulating the corresponding problem as a Bayesian
game.
In this paper we present a novel framework for AC based on Adversarial
Risk Analysis (ARA), Rios Insua et al. (2009). This is an emergent paradigm
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supporting decision makers who confront adversaries in problems with random
consequences that depend on the actions of all participants. ARA provides
one-sided prescriptive support to a decision maker maximizing her subjective
expected utility by treating the adversaries’ decisions as random variables. To
forecast them, we model the adversaries’ problems; however, our uncertainty
about their probabilities and utilities is propagated leading to the correspond-
ing random optimal adversarial decisions which provide the required distribu-
tions. ARA operationalizes the Bayesian approach to games, Kadane & Larkey
(1982) and Raiffa (1982), facilitating a procedure to predict adversarial de-
cisions. Compared with standard game theoretic approaches, ARA does not
assume the standard common knowledge hypothesis, according to which agents
share information about utilities and probabilities. Thus, we propose ACRA,
an approach to robustify classification in adversarial settings based on ARA,
which stems from the pioneering work by Dalvi et al. (2004) but avoids com-
mon knowledge assumptions prevalent in the available literature.
2. Adversarial Classification based on Adversarial Risk Analysis
In binary classification settings, an agent, that we call classifier (C, she), may
receive two types of objects, denoted as malicious (y = +) or innocent (y = −).
Objects have features x whose distribution depends on their type y. Classifi-
cation problems can be broken down into two separate stages, Bishop (2006):
an inference stage for learning pC(y|x), the classifier beliefs about the instance
type given the features; and a decision stage in which the agent, based on these
posterior probabilities, makes a class assignment decision yC perceiving some
utility uC(yC , y). The agent decides by maximizing expected utility, French
& Rios Insua (2000). This problem may be formulated through an influence
diagram (ID), Jensen & Gatti (2012), as in Figure 1a. Square nodes describe
decisions; circle nodes, uncertainties; double nodes represent deterministic as-
pects; and finally, hexagonal nodes refer to the associated utilities. Arcs have
the same interpretation as in Shachter (1986); those arcs pointing to decision
nodes are dashed and represent information available when the corresponding
decisions are made.
3
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(a) Classification as an
Influence Diagram
yC x′
y x a
uC uA
(b) Adversarial classification as a Bi-agent Influ-
ence Diagram
Figure 1
In adversarial settings, another agent, called adversary (A, he), chooses an
attack a which, applied to the features x, leads to the perturbed data x′ = a(x)
that are actually observed by C. A general transformation from x to x′ will
be designated ax→x′ . In this case, the ID describing the classification problem
must be augmented to incorporate adversarial decisions, leading to the bi-agent
influence diagram (BAID), Koller & Milch (2003), in Figure 1b. Grey nodes
refer to issues solely affecting A’s decision; white nodes to issues solely pertain-
ing to C’s decision; finally, striped nodes affect both agents. The adversary
and classifier decisions are represented through nodes a (chosen attack) and yC
(classification choice), respectively. The impact of the data transformation over
x implemented by A is described through node x′. The utilities of A and C are
represented with nodes uA and uC , respectively. Upon observing a particular
x′, C needs to determine the object class y. Her guess yC , which we shall also
denote c(x′), provides her with utility uC(yC , y). As before, she aims at maxi-
mizing expected utility. However, A also aims at maximizing his expected utility
trying to confuse the classifier. His utility has the form uA(yC , y, a), when C
says yC , the actual label is y and the attack is a, which has an implementation
cost.
Koller & Milch (2003) illustrated how to compute Nash equilibria in generic
BAIDs under common knowledge conditions. Gonza´lez-Ortega et al. (2019) ex-
tended BAIDs to situations in which there is no common knowledge, by using
the ARA solution concept, Banks et al. (2015), providing algorithms to compute
ARA solutions in BAIDs and displaying generic interactions between two agents
over time in support of one of the agents, the Defender, when protecting from
the other, the Attacker. The graph-theoretic ideas which are core in that paper,
are not required here as we have just one decision point for each of the agents,
4
in a sequential fashion. We are actually interested in a problem, adversarial
classification, different from the ones presented in such paper, and we provide
a thorough study of how ARA can be used to address it. As a consequence,
we adopt new forms and models adapted to classification tasks as well as spe-
cific algorithms to cope with the large size problems considered, paying special
attention to robustness issues.
In this paper, we thus develop a framework to support the classifier C in
choosing her classification decision and studying its robustness to exploratory
attacks, defined to have influence just over the operational data, but not over
the training data. As in Dalvi et al. (2004), we study cases in which A does not
attack innocent instances (y = −), denominated integrity-violation attacks, as
is the case in most security scenarios. We restrict our attention to deterministic
attacks, in the sense that their output is not random. Huang et al. (2011) and
Barreno et al. (2006) provide taxonomies of attacks against classifiers.
We shall need to forecast the attacker’s actions to support C in her decision
making process. For that we consider his problem. As we lack common knowl-
edge, we shall model our uncertainty about A’s beliefs and preferences and
compute A’s random optimal attack, which provides the required forecasting
distribution.
2.1. The classifier problem
We present first the classification problem faced by C as a Bayesian game
in Figure 2a, deduced from Figure 1b. We formulate a decision problem for C
in which A’s decision appears as random to the classifier, since she does not
know how the adversary will attack the data. Section 2.2 provides a procedure
to estimate the corresponding probabilities making this approach operational.
Suppose for now that we are capable of assessing from the classifier:
yC x′
y x a
uC
(a) Classifier problem
yC x′
y x a
uA
(b) Adversary problem
Figure 2
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1. pC(y), which describes her beliefs about the class distribution, with pC(+) +
pC(−) = 1, and pC(+), pC(−) ≥ 0.
2. pC(x|y), modeling her beliefs about the feature distribution given the class,
when A is not present. Thus, we need pC(x|+) and pC(x|−). Since we
focus on exploratory attacks, we can estimate pC(x|y) and pC(y) training
a generative classifier, Bishop & Lasserre (2007), on data which is clean
by assumption.
3. pC(x
′|a, x), which models her beliefs about the transformation results.
Since we consider only deterministic transformations, it will actually be
the case that pC(x
′|a, x) = I(x′ = a(x)), where I is the indicator function.
4. uC(yC , y), describing C’s utility when she classifies as yC an instance
whose actual label is y.
5. pC(a|x, y), portraying C’s beliefs about A’s action, given x and y.
In addition, we assume that C is able to compute the set A(x) of possible
attacks over a given instance x. When she observes x′, she could compute the
set X ′ = {x : a(x) = x′ for some a ∈ A(x)} of instances potentially leading
to x′. She should then aim at choosing the class yC with maximum posterior
expected utility. In our context, this means that she must find the class c(x′)
such that
c(x′) = arg max
yC
∑
y∈{+,−}
uC(yC , y)pC(y|x′) =
= arg max
yC
∑
y∈{+,−}
uC(yC , y)pC(y)pC(x
′|y) =
= arg max
yC
∑
y∈{+,−}
uC(yC , y)pC(y)
∑
x∈X ′
∑
a∈A(x)
pC(x
′, x, a|y).
For the second equation, we apply Bayes formula to compute p(y|x′), but ig-
nore the denominator, which is irrelevant for optimization purposes. Then, we
expand the term p(x′|y) taking into account the possible attacks. The presence
of A thus modifies pC(x
′|y), preventing us from directly using the training set
estimates of these elements. Therefore, we need to take into account A’s mod-
ifications through the probabilities pC(x
′, x, a|y). Furthermore, expanding the
last expression, we have
c(x′) = argmax
yC
∑
y∈{+,−}
[
uC(yC , y)pC(y)
∑
x∈X ′
∑
a∈A(x)
pC(x
′|x, a, y)pC(x, a|y)
]
=
= argmax
yC
∑
y∈{+,−}
[
uC(yC , y)pC(y)
∑
x∈X ′
∑
a∈A(x)
pC(x
′|x, a)pC(a|x, y)pC(x|y)
]
.
Recalling now that we consider only integrity-violation attacks, we have pC(a|x,−)
= I(a = id), where id stands for the identity attack leaving x unchanged and
I is the indicator function. Then, taking also into account assumption 3, the
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problem to be solved by C is
c(x′) = argmax
yC
[
uC(yC ,+)pC(+)
∑
x∈X ′
∑
a∈A(x)
I(x′ = a(x))pC(a|x,+)pC(x|+)
+ uC(yC ,−)pC(−)
∑
x∈X ′
∑
a∈A(x)
I(x′ = a(x))I(a = id)pC(x|−)
]
=
= argmax
yC
[
uC(yC ,+)pC(+)
∑
x∈X ′
pC(ax→x′ |x,+)pC(x|+)
+ uC(yC ,−)pC(x′|−)pC(−)
]
, (1)
where pC(ax→x′ |x,+) designates the probability that A will execute an attack
that transforms x into x′, when he receives (x, y = +), according to C.
Note that if the above mentioned game-theoretic common knowledge as-
sumptions held, C would be able to compute the set of instances that, with
probability 1, A would change to x′: we would know A’s beliefs and preferences
and, therefore, would be able to compute the attacks he is actually implement-
ing. Thus, we find out that for those potential attacks, pC(ax→x′ |x,+) would
be 1, and 0 for every other. Then, the model would just take into account
instances with probability 1, ignoring the others. But common knowledge is
not available, so we actually lack A’s beliefs and preferences. ACRA models
our uncertainty around them. As we shall see, in doing so we enhance model
robustness. Notice that in (1), we are summing pC(x|+) over all possible orig-
inating instances, weighting each element by pC(ax→x′ |x,+), thus taking into
account the uncertainty about A’s decision problem.
The ingredients 1-4 required in the analysis are standard in the decision ana-
lytic practice, Clemen & Reilly (2013). However, the fifth element pC(ax→x′ |x, y),
demands strategic thinking from C. To facilitate the corresponding forecast and
make the approach operational, we consider A’s decision making process.
2.2. The attacker problem
We assume that A aims at modifying x to maximize his expected utility by
making C classify malicious instances as innocent. The decision problem faced
by A is presented in Figure 2b, deduced from Figure 1b. In it, C’s decision
appears as an uncertainty to A. Suppose for now that we have available from
him:
1’. pA(x
′|a, x), describing his beliefs about the transformation results. As
with C, we make pA(x
′|a, x) = I(x′ = a(x)).
2’. uA(yC , y, a), which describes the utility that A attains when C says yC ,
the actual label is y and the attack is a. Note that this reflects certain
attack implementation costs.
3’. pA(c(x
′)|x′), which models A’s beliefs about the classification result when
C observes x′.
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In connection with the last ingredient, let us designate by p = pA(c(a(x)) =
+|a(x)) the probability that A concedes to C saying that the instance is mali-
cious, given that she observes the attacked data x′ = a(x). Since he will have
uncertainty about it, we denote its density by fA(p|a(x)) with expectation pAa(x).
Among all attacks, A would choose that maximizing his expected utility
a∗(x, y) = arg max
a
∫ [
uA(c(a(x)) = +, y, a) · p
+ uA(c(a(x)) = −, y, a) · (1− p)
]
fA(p|a(x))dp. (2)
Since we assume that A does not change the data when y = −, we only consider
the case y = +. Then, A’s expected utility when he adopts attack a and the
instance is (x, y = +) will be∫ [
uA(+,+, a) p+ uA(−,+, a) (1− p)
]
fA(p|a(x))dp =
= [uA(+,+, a)− uA(−,+, a)] pAa(x) + uA(−,+, a).
However, the classifier does not know the involved utilities uA and probabil-
ities pAa(x) from the adversary. Suppose we may model her uncertainty through
a random utility function UA and a random expectation P
A
a(x). Then, we could
solve for the random optimal attack, optimizing the random expected utility
A∗(x,+) = arg max
a
(
[UA(+,+, a)− UA(−,+, a)]PAa(x) + UA(−,+, a)
)
,
and make pC(ax→x′ |x,+) = Pr(A∗(x,+) = ax→x′), assuming that the set of
attacks is discrete.
We have therefore provided a way to approximate the remaining fifth ingredi-
ent in the classifier problem in Section 2.1, which is now operational. In general,
to approximate it we use simulation drawing K samples
(
UkA(yC ,+, a), P
A,k
a(x)
)
,
k = 1, . . . ,K from the random utilities and probabilities, finding
A∗k(x,+) = arg max
a
([
UkA(+,+, a)− UkA(−,+, a)
]
PA,ka(x) + U
k
A(−,+, a)
)
and estimating it through
p̂C(ax→x′ |x,+) = #{A
∗
k(x,+) = ax→x′}
K
. (3)
It is easy to prove that (3) converges almost surely to pC(ax→x′ |x,+).
Of the required random elements, it is relatively easy to model the ran-
dom utility UA(yC ,+, a) which would typically include two components. The
first one refers to A’s gain from C’s decision. If we adopt the notation YyCy
to represent the gain when C decides yC and the actual label is y, we use:
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−Y++ ∼ Ga(α1, β1) with α1/β1 = −d, d being the expected gain for A and
variance α1/β
2
1 as perceived, thus assuming that the utility obtained by A
when C classifies a truly malicious instance as malicious is negative. Simi-
larly, Y−+ ∼ Ga(α2, β2) with α2/β2 = e, the expected gain for A, and variance
α2/β
2
2 as perceived. Our choice of gamma distributions to model the uncertainty
about the adversary preferences is motivated by its properties: they combine the
relative simplicity of depending on two parameters with the variety of shapes
they can take and the possibility of easily specifying their parameters once a
guess (e.g., the mean) about the quantity of interest is available along with an
opinion about the spread (e.g., the variance). Finally, Y+− = Y−− = δ0, the
degenerate distribution at 0, assuming that the adversary does not receive any
utility from innocent instances. The second component refers to the random
cost B of implementing an attack. Then, the gain of the attacker would be
YyCy − B. Finally, assuming that A is risk prone, French & Rios Insua (2000),
the random utility could be computed as UA(yC , y, a) = exp(ρ (YyCy−B)) with,
say, ρ ∼ U [a1, a2], a1 > 0, the random risk proneness coefficient.
On the other hand, modeling PAa(x), A’s (random) expected probability that
C declares an instance as malicious when she observes x′ = a(x), is more del-
icate. It entails strategic thinking as C needs to understand his opponent’s
beliefs about what classification she will make when she observes x′. This could
be the beginning of a hierarchy of decision making problems, as described in
Rios & Rios Insua (2012) in a much simpler context. We illustrate here the
initial stage of such hierarchy in our problem area. First, A does not know the
terms in the decision making problem (1) faced by the classifier. By assum-
ing uncertainty over them through the random distributions PAC (+), P
A
C (x|+),
PAC (x
′|−), PAC (ax→x′ |x,+) and utilities UAC (yC ,+), UAC (yC ,−), he would get
the corresponding random optimal decision replacing the incumbent elements
in (1) to obtain PAa(x). However, observe that this requires the assessment of
PAC (ax→x′ |x,+) (what C believes that A thinks about her beliefs concerning
the action he would implement given the observed data) for which there is a
strategic component, leading to the next stage in the announced hierarchy. One
would typically stop at a level in which no more information is available. At
that stage, we could use a non-informative prior over the involved probabilities
and utilities.
For the first stage of this hierarchy, a relevant heuristic to assess PAa(x) may
be based on the probability PrC(c(x
′) = +|x′) = r that C assigns to the object
received being malicious assuming that she observed x′, with some uncertainty
around it. Being a probability, r ranges in [0, 1] and we could make PAa(x) ∼
βe(δ1, δ2),with mean δ1/(δ1 + δ2) = r and variance (δ1δ2)/[(δ1 + δ2)
2(δ1 + δ2 +
1)] = var as perceived, leading to
δ1 =
(
1− r
var
− 1
r
)
r2, δ2 = δ1
(
1
r
− 1
)
. (4)
Specifics would depend on the case at hand. In general, given the observed x′,
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we could consider all attacks leading to it, differentiating between instances with
original label + and those with original label −; computing the probabilities of
observing the malicious ones and adding them to obtain p1; performing the
same process with innocent instances to obtain p2; and, finally making r =
p1/(p1 + p2).
2.3. Algorithmic implementation
Once we have a Monte Carlo routine to estimate pC(ax→x′ |x,+) as in (3),
which entails the availability of a routine to generate from the random utility
function, as in the Appendix, we implement the scheme described above as
follows, where xˆ indicates estimate of x.
1. Preprocessing
Train a generative classifier to estimate pC(y) and pC(x|y), assuming that
the training set has not been tainted.
2. Operation
Read x′.
Estimate pC(ax→x′ |x,+).
Solve
c(x′) = arg max
yC
[
u(yC ,+)p̂C(+)
∑
x∈X ′
p̂C(ax→x′ |x,+)p̂C(x|+)
+ u(yC ,−)p̂C(x′|−)p̂C(−)
]
.
Output c(x′).
3. An example in spam detection
We illustrate the ACRA approach with a spam detection problem. We have
data referring to m emails characterized through the bag-of-words representa-
tion, Zhang et al. (2010): binary features indicate the presence (1) or not (0)
of n relevant words in a dictionary. Additionally, a label indicates whether
the message is spam (+) or not (−). Thus, an email is assimilated with an
n-dimensional vector x of 0’s or 1’s, together with a label y. In this example, we
consider only good word insertion attacks, Dalvi et al. (2004). For simplicity,
we illustrate the method in detail only when adding at most one word (1-GWI),
but our method can be applied, with precautions discussed later, to the case
of k added words (k-GWI). An example asseses how the method works in the
case 2-GWI in Section 5. 1-GWI entails converting at most one of the 0’s of the
originally received message into a 1.
Given a message x = (x1, x2, .., xn), with xi ∈ {0, 1}, let us designate by
I(x) the set of indices such that xi = 0. Then, the set of possible attacks in
this case is A(x) = {a0 = id, ai;∀i ∈ I(x)}, where ai transforms the i-th 0
into a 1. In turn, given a message x′ received by C, we designate by J(x′) the
indices of features with value 1 in x′. If we designate by x′j a message potentially
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leading to x′, derived by changing the j-th 1 in x′ with a 0, the set of possibly
originating messages would be X ′ = {x′, x′j ;∀j ∈ J(x′)}.
3.1. Classifier elements
The elements required to solve the classifier problem, Section 2.1, include the
utility function uC(yC , y), which is standard, and the distributions pC(y) and
pC(x|y), also standard if we just consider, as we do here, exploratory attacks.
As we mentioned, we could use our favorite generative classifier to estimate
them. Finally, pC(ax→x′ |x, y) has a strategic component and we use ARA to
approximate it.
3.2. Adversary elements
The adversary’s random utilities follow the general arguments in Section
2.2. We also need to assess PAa(x). We use the heuristic there proposed, with
the following caveat. If the original label is −, the mail is innocent and the
adversary does not change it, thus coinciding with the received one; we denote
by q0 = pC(x
′|−)pC(−) the probability of this event happening, according to
C. If the original label is +, the mail is malicious, and A might change it in an
attempt to fool the classifier; according to C, the original message x′j happens
with probability qj = pC(x
′
j |+)pC(+),∀j ∈ J(x′). However, the adversary
might decide not to attack even if the email is spam; according to C, this
happens with probability qn+1 = pC(x
′|+)pC(+). Then
ra =
∑
i∈J[a(x)] qi + qn+1
q0 +
∑
i∈J[a(x)] qi + qn+1
(5)
is the probability of C believing that the observation a(x) has label +, when she
is aware of the presence of A. For such attack a, we could make δa1/(δ
a
1+δ
a
2 ) = ra
and (δa1δ
a
2 )/[(δ
a
1 + δ
a
2 )
2(δa1 + δ
a
2 + 1)] = var and solve for δ
a
1 and δ
a
2 as in (4).
3.3. Example
The above ingredients allow us to implement Routines 1 and 2 in the Ap-
pendix, to generate from the random utility function and estimate pC(ax→x′ |x,+),
respectively. With this, we follow the scheme in Section 2.3. We illustrate it in
a simplified spam filtering problem1, and compare it against the utility sensi-
tive naive Bayes (NB) classifier, a standard non adversarial generative approach
in this application area, Song et al. (2009). We use the Spambase Data Set
from the UCI Machine Learning repository, Lichman (2013). It consists of 4601
emails, out of which 1813 are spam. For each email, the database contains infor-
mation about 54 relevant words. The bag-of-words representation with binary
features assimilates each email with a 54 dimensional vector x of 0’s and 1’s.
1For the sake of reproducibility, we provide the open source version of the code used for
the examples at https://github.com/roinaveiro/ACRA_spam_experiment.git. The data is
publicly available at https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/spambase.
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The dataset will be divided into training and hold-out test sets, respectively
comprising 75% and 25% of the data.
We first train a utility sensitive NB classifier using the training data, unal-
tered by assumption. For comparison purposes, and in order to check utility
robustness, we use four utility functions. One of them is the 0/1 utility, i.e. the
utility is 1 if the instance is correctly classified and 0 otherwise. For the rest,
we chose utility 1 for correctly classified instances and -1 for spam classified as
legitimate. The penalty for classifying non-spam mail as spam was set, respec-
tively, to -2, -5 and -10 in the other three cases. The corresponding NB classifier
will serve for comparison as well as basis for the ACRA approach providing the
required p̂C(y) and p̂C(x|y).
To compare ACRA with NB on tampered data, we simulate attacks over
the instances in the test set. For this purpose, we solved the adversary problem
(2) for each test email. Uncertainty in the adversary’s utility function is not
present from his point of view, thus, we fixed −uA(+,+, a) = 5, uA(−,+, a) = 5,
uA(−,−, a) = uA(+,−, a) = 0. The cost for implementing an attack was set
to b = 0.5 · d(a), where d(a) is the number of word changes (0 or 1) associated
with attack a. The risk proneness coefficient was set to ρ = 0.5. Finally, the
adversary would have uncertainty about pAa(x), as this quantity depends on the
classifier decision. We test ACRA against a worst case adversary, who knows
the true value of pAa(x). With this, we attacked each test email to generate the
attacked test set.
From the classifier’s point of view, the adversary’s parameters were fixed at:
−UA(+,+, a) ∼ Ga(α1, β1) with E[−UA(+,+, a)] = 5 and Var[−UA(+,+, a)] =
0.01, entailing α1 = 2500, β1 = 0.002; UA(−,+, a) ∼ Ga(α2, β2), again with
α2 = 2500, β2 = 0.002; UA(−,−, a) = UA(+,−, a) = δ0. The random cost of
implementing a particular attack a was set to B = d(a) · α, where d(a) is the
number of word changes (0 or 1) associated with attack a, and α ∼ U [0.4, 0.6].
The random risk proneness coefficient was set to ρ ∼ U [0.4, 0.6]. Observe that
the attacker values are set as the means of the classifier distributions used to
model them. We study later on how departures from the assumed adversary
behaviour affects both ACRA and the corresponding game theoretic solution
performance.
In order to obtain PAa(x) for a given attack a, we need to generate from a
beta distribution with mean PrC(c(a(x)) = +|a(x)), requiring its density to be
concave in its support. Otherwise, we would be believing that the probability
that A concedes to C deciding the instance a(x) is malicious is peaked around
0 and 1 and low in between, which makes no sense in our context. Then, its
variance must be bounded from above by ∆ = min
{
[r2(1 − r)]/(1 + r), [r(1 −
r)2]/(2 − r)}. We fix the adjustable variance var at k∆ with k ∈ [0, 1]: the
bigger k is, the bigger C’s uncertainty will be about A’s behavior. We ran
experiments for each k ∈ {0.01, 0.1, 0.2, · · · , 0.9}. Finally, we fixed K = 1000,
the Monte Carlo sample size in (3).
As performance metrics, we used the accuracy, utility, false positive (FPR)
and false negative (FNR) rates, estimated via repeated hold-out validation over
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Figure 3: Average accuracy versus k for different utility models.
100 repetitions, Kim (2009). We represent the results of the ACRA algorithm
over the tampered test set with a solid line. The dashed line corresponds to
the results of the utility sensitive NB on the attacked test, referred to as NB-
Tainted. The error bars represent the standard deviation of each metric, also
estimated through repeated hold-out validation. In addition, as a benchmark,
we show the results of the utility sensitive NB over the original, untampered
test set with a dotted line. We refer to these as NB-Plain. Obviously, NB-Plain
and NB-Tainted metrics do not depend on k.
Figures 3 and 4 respectively present the average accuracies and utilities for
various values of k and the four utility models. Observe first that the presence
of an adversary considerably degrades NB performance both in accuracy and
average utility, as NB-Plain is consistently above NB-Tainted. This one is still
correctly classifying the same proportion of non spam as NB-Plain, as such
emails have not been attacked. However, NB-Tainted is not able to identify a
large proportion of attacked spam emails. Consequently, as we increase the cost
of misclassifying non-spam, reducing the relative importance of misclassifying
spam, the performance of NB clearly degrades. This lack of robustness to attacks
confirms the need to take into account the presence of adversaries.
In contrast, ACRA is robust to attacks and identifies most of the spam. Its
overall accuracy is above 0.9, thus identifying most non-spam emails. Observe
though that ACRA degrades as k grows: the bigger k is, the less precise the
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Figure 4: Average attained utility versus k for different utility models.
knowledge that C has about A and the classifier performance will degrade. One
of our contributions is providing parameters that may be tuned to adapt to the
knowledge that the classifier could have about her opponent.
Very interestingly, note that in Figures 3 and 4 ACRA beats NB-Plain in
both accuracy and utility. This effect has been observed by Dalvi et al. (2004)
and Goodfellow et al. (2015) for different algorithms and different application
areas. The latter argues that taking into account the presence of an adversary
has an effect similar to that of a regularizer, being able to improve the original
accuracy of the base algorithm and making it more robust.
To better understand these results, we plotted FPR and FNR in Figures 5
and 6, respectively. FPR coincides for NB-Plain and NB-Tainted as the adver-
sary is not modifying innocent instances. Both FPR and FNR grow with k for
ACRA: the more the classifier knows about the adversary strategy, the better
she protects, and lower FPR and FNR are attained. In addition, an increase
of uC(+,−) raises the cost of false positives, reducing FPR at the expense of
increasing FNR.
Regarding the conceptual comparison of different algorithms, observe that
false negatives undermine the performance of NB on tampered data. In contrast,
ACRA seems more robust, presenting smaller FNR than NB-Tainted. ACRA
has also significantly lower FPR than NB, causing the overall performance to
raise up. The reason for this is that the adversary is very unlikely to apply
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Figure 5: Average false positive rate versus k for different utility models.
the identity attack to a spam, as the cost difference between such attack and
1-GWI attacks is small in terms of utility gain. Then, for a legitimate email
that NB classifies as positive, i.e. has high pC(x|+), ACRA will give a very low
weight to pC(x|+), thus reducing the probability of classifying such email as
spam. Reducing FPR is crucial in spam detection, as filtering out a non-spam
is typically more undesirable than letting spam reach the user. Interestingly
enough, ACRA also has lower FNR than NB-Plain, specially for low values of
k, although this improvement is not as remarkable as that for FPR. Both effects
together produce ACRA to outperform utility sensitive NB both in tainted and
untainted data: we enhance the classifier performance by taking advantage of
the information we may have about the adversary, a core idea underlying ACRA.
3.4. Robustness
We have tested the ACRA algorithm against an adversary whose parameters
were fixed to the expected values of the distributions assumed by the classifier.
It is natural to ask how departures from such assumptions about the adversary’s
behaviour would affect performance. In this section, we compare the robustness
of ACRA and the corresponding game theoretic solution, to departures from the
assumed value of pAa(x), the expected value of the probability that A concedes
to C saying that the instance a(x) is malicious. As we discussed above, this is
clearly the most challenging assessment.
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Figure 6: Average false negative rate versus k for different utility models.
The game theoretic solution assumes common knowledge. For the case of
pAa(x) this means that this quantity is fixed at a certain value, shared by both
A and C. Thus C, when modelling A, assumes that he is using a certain value
of pAa(x) that coincides with the one that he is actually using. For robustness
purposes, we attacked the test set solving the attacker problem (2) for each
test instance x, but using this time perturbed values of pAa(x) around the one
assumed by C. To do so, we sample pAa(x) from a beta distribution centered
at the assumed value, with variance kA∆, where kA is the proportion of the
maximum allowed variance ∆ (again, we require the density to be concave in
its support). We compare performance against this attacker of both the ACRA
solution, which models uncertainty on pAa(x) by placing a beta distribution cen-
tered at the assumed value of pAa(x) and variance k∆, and the game theoretic
solution for which pAa(x) is fixed at its assumed value. We performed experi-
ments for different values of k and kA. Results for the percentage accuracy
gain of ACRA, i.e. ACRA percentage accuracy minus game theory percentage
accuracy, are presented in Figure 7a. As can be seen, if the attacker behaves
closely to the common knowledge assumptions (i.e. low kA), then the game the-
oretic solution and ACRA with low variance behave similarly. If in this case,
we increase the variance assumed by ACRA, then its performance degrades, as
it is overestimating the uncertainty. If the variance of the distribution that the
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adversary puts in pAa(x) is high (i.e. high kA), then big deviations from the com-
mon knowledge value of pAa(x) are more likely, thus degrading the performance
of the game theoretic solution. Nevertheless, in this case ACRA remains robust
to these perturbations, thanks to accounting for uncertainty on the adversary’s
value of pAa(x). In addition, although not shown in the Figure, ACRA’s accuracy
was above 0.89 for every pair (k, kA), beating always the NB algorithm.
(a) (b)
Figure 7: ACRA accuracy gain with respect to the game theoretic solution.
One could argue that this comparison is not sufficiently fair, as we are sam-
pling the adversary’s values of pAa(x) from a beta distribution, that is the one
assumed by ACRA. Figure 7b shows the results of an alternative experiment. In
this case, to perturb the values of pAa(x) of each test instance, we add a number,
uniformly distributed in the interval [−kA, kA], to the common knowledge value.
As can be seen, in this case ACRA is again more robust to this imprecision in
the attacker’s model, thus providing better generalization. In addition, ACRA’s
accuracy was not excessively damaged despite using perturbed values of pAa(x),
being above 0.87 for every pair (k, kA).
4. Computational issues
The raw version of ACRA presented above may turn out to be extremely
heavy computationally in some application domains in which little assumptions
about the adversary behaviour are made. We first asses ACRA computationally
and then propose several solutions.
4.1. Computational assessment
Note first that if no assumptions about the attacks are made, the sets A(x),
and consequently X ′, could grow rapidly. The size of these sets strongly de-
pends on the application domain. For instance, in spam detection the number
of possible adversarial manipulations is 2n, where n is the number of words
considered by C to undertake the classification.
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In fact, the size of X ′ affects critically the number of computations. Notice
that in order to classify a given instance x′, we need to estimate pC(ax→x′ |x,+)
for each x ∈ X ′ to compute the summation in (1). In addition, estimating
each pC(ax→x′ |x,+) requires a MC simulation with size K, see Estimate
pC(ax→x′ |x,+) routine of the Appendix. Thus, if G represents the compu-
tational cost of each MC sample, the overall cost to classify one instance would
be K · |X ′| ·G. Moreover, G could depend on the size of A(x).
We study now how to reduce the computational burden of ACRA by means
of reducing the size of X ′ and the MC size K without affecting performance too
much.
4.2. Computational enhancements
One possibility to reduce |X ′| could be to use application-specific informa-
tion to restrict the class of possible attacks. For instance, if we consider only
k-GWI attacks in spam detection, the size of X ′ is reduced to O(nk). In ad-
dition, case-specific constraints about the adversary behavior could be used to
achieve a greater decrease. For example, in GWI we may reduce n assuming
that some words cannot be modified by the adversary, or limit the number of
words inserted, either explicitly, or implicitly through penalizing the insertion
of additional words.
Apart from using application-specific information, we present now several
general suggestions which can be used to alleviate the computational burden.
Note first that the optimization problem (1) may be reformulated as setting
c(x′) = + if and only if
∑
x∈X ′ pC(ax→x′ |x,+)pC(x|+) > t, where
t =
[
uC(−,−)− uC(+,−)
]
pC(x
′|−)pC(−)[
uC(+,+)− uC(−,+)
]
pC(+)
.
Rather than going through the whole X ′, we can approximate the left hand
side summation through Monte Carlo. Should {xn} be a sample of size N
from pC(x|+), with N lower than the cardinality of X ′, the condition would be
approximated through
I =
1
N
N∑
n=1
pC(axn→x′ |xn,+)I(xn ∈ X ′) > t. (6)
A potential problem with this approach is that pC(x|+) for x ∈ X ′ is generally
small and a standard MC sample might contain few points in X ′. We could use
importance sampling, Owen & Zhou (2000), to mitigate this issue for example
using the restriction of p(x|+) to X ′ as importance distribution. Let p˜(x|+) be
the probability distribution defined by
p˜(x|+) = p(x|+)
Q
· I(x ∈ X ′)
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with Q =
∑
x∈X ′ p(x|+) . Then∑
x∈X ′
pC(ax→x′ |x,+)pC(x|+) =
∑
x∈X ′
pC(ax→x′ |x,+)pC(x|+)
p˜(x|+) p˜(x|+)
= Q
∑
x∈X ′
pC(ax→x′ |x,+)p˜(x|+).
Now, if {xn} is a sample of size N from p˜(x|+), we could approximate our target
quantity I by
I˜ =
Q
N
N∑
n=1
pC(axn→x′ |xn,+). (7)
We should take into account, though, the inherent uncertainty in the above
MC approximations when checking inequality (6). An estimate ∆˜ of its standard
deviation would be
∆˜ =
√∑N
i=1Q
2p2C(axi→x′ |xi,+)−NI˜2
N − 1 .
We would then declare c(x′) = + if I˜ − 2∆˜ > t. Observe that we could test
this condition sequentially, before reaching the maximum size N allowed by our
computational budget. By making I˜m and ∆˜m depend on the sample size m,
we would check sequentially whether
I˜m − 2∆˜m > t, (8)
and stop if verified, with I˜m and ∆˜m defined sequentially, since
I˜m =
(m− 1)I˜m−1 + pC(axm→x′ |xm,+)
m
,
∆˜2m =
(m− 2)∆˜2m−1 +Q2p2C(axm→x′ |xm,+) + (m− 1)I˜2m−1 −mI˜2m
m− 1 .
Note that with the proposed enhancement, the number of computations is K ·N
rather than K · |X ′| , where N is the chosen sample size. Thus, we manage
to eliminate the dependence on |X ′|. N should be fixed to trade off between
accuracy and speed.
A complementary possibility to speed up computations is to use a relatively
small MC size K for estimating pC(ax→x′ |x,+). To mitigate getting null prob-
abilities, we could adopt a Dirichlet-multinomial model with non-informative
prior Dir(1, 1, ..., 1) over the probabilities of the attacks in A(x) and approxi-
mate such probability through
p̂C(ax→x′ |x,+) = #{a
∗
k = ax→x′}+ 1
K + |A(x)| .
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Moreover, we could use a regression metamodel, Kleijnen (1992), based on ap-
proximating in detail pC(ax→x′ |x,+) at some pairs (x, x′), as allowed by our
computational budget, fit a regression model ψ(x, x′) to (x, x′, p̂C(ax→x′ |x,+))
and use it to replace pC(ax→x′ |x,+) in the above expressions.
Last, but not least, ACRA is amenable of parallelization in at least two
respects. Observe first that the terms in summations (6) or (7) may be eval-
uated independently. To improve performance, we may compute batches of
those terms in parallel by running different processes at different nodes of a
multi-core cluster. Whenever we use the sequential approach in (8), this par-
allelization strategy would require a master node that checks such condition
periodically when the computation of any batch of terms finishes in the cor-
responding worker node. Finally, recall that computing terms in summations
(6) or (7) entails a simulation. We could accelerate the computation of each
simulation by running in parallel different processes for different batches of MC
samples. Both parallelization strategies could be combined by sending different
simulations to different nodes in the cluster, and parallelizing each simulation
within the cores of each node.
The combination of the above approaches alleviates tremendously the com-
putational burden and largely makes ACRA computationally feasible as we show
next.
5. Application
We illustrate several of the proposed enhancements with the example in
Section 3.3. We start by testing the ACRA framework using MC simulation (MC
ACRA) with importance sampling and the sequential strategy (8) against the
raw algorithm (ACRA). We tried different MC sample sizes N , measuring them
as proportions of the cardinal of X ′: e.g. an MC sample size of 0.5 corresponds
to considering N = |X ′|/2 values. We fixed K = 1000, the MC size in the
Estimate pC(ax→x′ |x,+) function, the adjustable var parameter k to 0.1, and
used the 0/1 utility. Table 1 shows the average performance metrics, with
Size Accuracy FPR FNR
ACRA 1.00 0.919± 0.010 0.019± 0.008 0.177± 0.022
MC ACRA 0.75 0.912± 0.012 0.032± 0.009 0.174± 0.023
MC ACRA 0.50 0.905± 0.016 0.027± 0.009 0.199± 0.032
MC ACRA 0.25 0.885± 0.029 0.021± 0.007 0.260± 0.067
MC ACRA 0.10 0.841± 0.047 0.016± 0.005 0.370± 0.120
NB-Tainted - 0.761± 0.101 0.680± 0.100 0.500± 0.250
Table 1: Comparison between MC ACRA, raw ACRA and NB.
standard deviations, of the algorithms over 100 experiments. Note that as the
sample size N increases, accuracy also increases. Nevertheless, we get fairly
good results for relatively small sample sizes. For example, with just a 0.1
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sample size we manage to beat NB in accuracy as well as in FPR and FNR.
Considering a 0.5 sample size, we almost recover the original performance levels.
To compare execution times, we computed the speed up (quotient between
execution times of ACRA and MC ACRA over all 100 experiments). Figure
8a presents the speed up histogram, Table 2 shows mean and median speed
ups for the MC sizes (0.25, 0.5, 0.75). As expected, the median is close to the
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Figure 8: Speed up histograms.
inverse of the MC size, e.g. when size is 0.5, MC ACRA performs approximately
twice faster than ACRA. Nevertheless, the speed up distributions (Figure 8a)
are skewed to the right suggesting that MC ACRA performs much faster on
average. This is due to the sequential rule (8): for some instances, such condition
is reached in a few iterations and, consequently, over those instances MC ACRA
performs much faster than ACRA.
Size Mean Median
0.25 6.20 3.69
0.50 5.30 2.00
0.75 4.86 1.31
Table 2: Mean and median speed ups.
We have also tested the first parallelization approach in Section 4, computing
in parallel the terms in the MC approximation (7). We used a 16 core processor
for this purpose. We performed 100 experiments fixing the variance parameter
k = 0.1, MC size to 0.5 and 0/1 utility. The histogram of speed ups is in
Figure 8b. In this case, both the mean (4.856) and median (4.530) are close.
We do not use the sequential approach (8) and consequently, extreme values do
not occur. Nevertheless, we obtain a huge improvement in time performance,
almost 5 times faster both in mean and median.
The combination of the above approaches induces considerable improve-
ments rendering ACRA largely feasible, as we illustrate with the results of an
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experiment under 2-GWI attacks with different databases2 in Table 3. As in
previous examples, we report averages over 100 experiments performed under
different train-test splits. Observe that MC ACRA with size 0.5 consistently
beats utility sensitive NB.
Dataset Accuracy FPR FNR
MC 0.5 ACRA UCI 0.904± 0.012 0.037± 0.007 0.187± 0.023
NB-Tainted UCI 0.724± 0.088 0.066± 0.008 0.601± 0.022
MC 0.5 ACRA Enron-Spam 0.824± 0.017 0.132± 0.012 0.305± 0.073
NB-Tainted Enron-Spam 0.534± 0.011 0.283± 0.013 1.000± 0.000
MC 0.5 ACRA Ling-Spam 0.958± 0.008 0.039± 0.001 0.057± 0.030
NB-Tainted Ling-Spam 0.800± 0.016 0.040± 0.001 1.000± 0.000
Table 3: Comparison between size 0.5 MC ACRA and NB under 2-GWI attacks.
6. Discussion
Adversarial classification aims at enhancing classification algorithms to achieve
robustness in presence of adversarial examples, as usually encountered in many
security applications. The pioneering work of Dalvi et al. (2004) framed most of
later approaches to adversarial classification within the standard game theoretic
paradigm, in spite of the unrealistic common knowledge assumptions required,
actually even questioned by the authors. This motivated us to focus on an ARA
perspective to the problem presenting ACRA, a general framework for adver-
sarial classification that mitigates such assumption. Our framework is general
in the sense that application-specific assumptions are kept to a minimum. Also,
we have provided empirical evidence supporting the robustness of the ACRA
framework to imprecisions in the assumptions made about the adversary. In par-
ticular, ACRA has been shown to be more robust than its common knowledge,
purely game theoretic counterpart. Finally, we have presented computational
enhancements that have significantly improved ACRA performance, allowing us
to solve large problems and use it in operational settings.
Our framework may be extended in several ways. First of all, in our examples
we have used NB as the basic classifier in the preprocessing phase. We could use
other generative classifiers, such as variational autoencoders, or even a mixture
of them. It would be very interesting to extend the framework to use it with
discriminative classifiers, specifically based on neural networks.
We could extend the ACRA approach to situations in which there is repeated
play of the adversarial classification game, thus introducing the possibility of
learning the adversarial utilities and probabilities in a Bayesian way.
2Besides the UCI Spam Data Set, we used the Enron-Spam Data Set at https://
www.cs.cmu.edu/~enron and the Ling-Spam Data Set at http://csmining.org/index.php/
ling-spam-datasets.html
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We have only considered exploratory attacks, but we could extend the ap-
proach to take into account attacks over the training data, called poisoning
attacks, Biggio et al. (2012). In addition, we have just considered the case in
which the attacker performs intentional attacks. In some problems, there could
be, in addition, random attacks. The proposed framework could be adapted to
take those into account as well as to the case in which there are several attackers.
Finally, our work could be extended to the case of attacks to innocent
instances (not just integrity violation ones). In this case, when computing
pC(x
′|−) in (1) we must proceed similarly as we did when computing pC(x′|+):
we consider all possible originating instances x leading to x′, and sum them
weighting each of them with their pC(ax→x′ |x,−), the probability of the attacker
choosing the attack linking each of them with x′, given that they are innocent.
This would just involve replacing pC(x
′|−) by ∑x∈X ′ pC(ax→x′ |x,−)pC(x|−) in
(1). Finally, as computing both pC(ax→x′ |x,−) and pC(ax→x′ |x,+) demands
strategic thinking, we need to consider the attacker’s problem as we did in Sec-
tion 2.2, but this time allowing the attacker to modify also innocent instances.
We have concentrated on binary classification problems, but the extension to
multi-label classification is relevant. This would entail including the summands
corresponding to each class in (1) and building an appropriate attacker model
depending on his particular interests: for instance, he could be interested on
making the classifier mislabel any instance or in making her classify instances
within a particular group of classes. It is clear that the presence of an adver-
sary would invalidate the one-vs-one and one-vs-rest approaches to multiclass
classification, as this procedure could be easily exploited. This would affect the
choice of the base classifier within the ACRA approach.
We have illustrated the approach in spam detection, but other security areas
like malware or fraud detection are truly important. Finally, note that in ACRA
we go through a simulation stage to forecast attacks and an optimization stage
to determine optimal classification. The whole process might be performed in a
single stage, possibly based on augmented probability simulation, Bielza et al.
(1999).
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Appendix
We include here the routines to generate from the random utility function
(Routine 1) and estimate pC(ax→x′ |x,+) (Routine 2) required in the spam de-
tection problem.
Routine 1
function Generate Uk(yC ,+, a)
Generate Bk ∼ B, ρk ∼ U [a1, a2]
Generate Y k++ ∼ −Ga(α1, β1), Y k−+ ∼ Ga(α2, β2)
Uk(yC , y, a) = exp(ρ
k(Y kyC ,y −Bk))
return Uk(yC , y, a)
end function
where k designates a generic sample instance in the Monte Carlo scheme.
Routine 2
function Estimate pC(ax→x′ |x,+)
for x ∈ X ′ do
Compute A(x)
for a ∈ A(x) do
Compute a(x) and ra using (5)
Using ra and var, compute δ
a
1 , δ
a
2 as in (4)
end for
for k = 1, 2, . . . ,K do
for a ∈ A(x) do
Generate Uk(yC ,+, a), P
Ak
a ∼ βe(δa1 , δa2 )
Compute ψk(a) =
[
UkA(+,+, a)− UkA(−,+, a)
]
PAka +U
k
A(−,+, a)
end for
Compute a∗k = arg maxa∈A(x) ψ
k(a)
end for
Compute
p̂C(ax→x′ |x,+) = #{a
∗
k = ax→x′}
K
Store p̂C(ax→x′ |x,+)
end for
end function
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